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ARGUMENT 
I. PETITIONERS ARE NOT SEEKING TO CREATE AN EXCEPTION TO 
THE WORKERS COMPENSATION ACT FOR THE EXCLUSION OF 
ALL INJURIES WHICH OCCUR AT A HOME WORK SITE. 
Respondent Charles Tjas argues that Petitioners, AE Clevite, Inc. and Liberty 
Mutual Insurance Co. (hereinafter referred to jointly as "AE Clevite"), are requesting this 
Court to "engraft an exception to Utah's determinative statute, so that it would provide 
coverage 'wherever such injury occurred,' unless such an injury occurred at home." 
(Brief of Respondent Charles Tjas (Employee) in Opp. to Pet. for Writ of Cert., 
hereinafter referred to as "Employee's Opp. Brief," p. 9) (emphasis in original). 
Unfortunately, for whatever reason, Respondent Tjas has chosen to 
mischaracterize the position of AE Clevite. Petitioners are not seeking an exception to 
the provisions of the Utah Workers Compensation Act. Rather, AE Clevite is requesting 
that this Court accept review of the Court of Appeals' opinion in order to evaluate the 
appropriate legal standard to apply, in a case of first impression, to the new, and rapidly 
expanding, situation of an employee who performs part of his work at a home work site. 
AE Clevite does not seek to exclude an injury merely because it occurred at a home work 
site; rather, Petitioners ask this Court to adopt a legal standard which is consistent with 
Utah case law, the majority position of jurisdictions across the country, and the standard 
proposed by Professor Larson. 
Under the standard proposed by AE Clevite, an injury at a home work site would 
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be compensable as long as there is a substantial work relationship between the accident 
and the employee's work. For example, a claim for carpal tunnel syndrome by an 
employee who performs repetitive upper extremity work, i.e., data entry or typing, at a 
home work site would likely be compensable. Similarly, if Mr. Tjas had fallen while 
loading his car with work-related materials, his claim would clearly be compensable. 
This standard is consistent with Professor Larson's proposed rule which allows 
compensation for injures at a home work site when the accident occurs during the actual 
performance of the work. 1A. Larson, Larson's Workers Compensation, desk Edition, § 
18.34 (1998) (emphasis added). 
Prior Utah cases have recognized that employees who have been injured while 
away from an employer-controlled facility will receive benefits when the facts 
demonstrate a substantial work relationship, thereby shifting a personal risk to a risk 
assumed by the employer. See, e.g.. Black v. McDonald's of Layton, 733 P.2d 154 
(Utah 1987) (recreational cases evaluated by a 4-part test in order to determine question 
of sufficient work relationship); State Tax Comm'n v. Industrial Comm'n, 685 P.2d 1051 
(Utah 1984) (special mission exception); Ogden Standard Examiner v. Industrial 
Comm'n, 663 P.2d 88 (Utah 1983) (dual purpose rule requiring that the business purpose 
predominant); Hafer v. Industrial Comm'n, 526 P.2d 1188 (Utah 1974) (employee is 
engaged in actual assigned work duties); Moser v. Industrial Comm'n, 440 P.2d 23 (Utah 
1968) (employee is acting at the specific direction of the employer); Buczynski v. 
Industrial Comm'n, 934 P.2d 1169 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (traveling employee doctrine). 
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II. THE ISSUE OF THE APPROPRIATE STANDARD TO APPLY TO 
INJURIES WHICH MAY OCCUR AT A HOME WORK SITE HAS 
NEVER BEEN PREVIOUSLY ADDRESSED BY THE UTAH 
APPELLATE COURTS OR THE UTAH LABOR COMMISSION. 
Mr. Tjas asserts that this case does not present an issue of first impression. 
Rather, he argues that it merely presents a situation which neither the Utah appellate 
courts nor the Labor Commission has ever reviewed. This argument is a distinction 
without a difference. Neither the opinion from the Court of Appeals, nor the decision 
from the Labor Commission, nor any of Respondents' briefs, have identified any Utah 
case with facts similar to those presented in this case. Given the significant - and 
expanding - scope of work-at-home employees, this Court should enunciate the legal 
standard to apply to such situations. 
The provisions of the Workers Compensation Act state that in order for an injury 
to be compensable it must "arise out of and in the course o f the claimant's employment. 
These statutory terms have been interpreted over the years by the Utah Supreme Court in 
a variety of circumstances and situations. Rather than merely state and apply a general 
standard to all cases, this Court has, instead, established a number of legal standards 
which govern the particular nature of a claim. For example, while the statute states that 
an accident may be compensable "wherever such injury occurred," the Court has adopted 
different standards which expressly look to where the injury occurred. Specifically, the 
Court has adopted the "personal comfort rule" and the "premises rule" for injuries 
occurring on an employer-controlled premises. For injuries occurring away from an 
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employer-controlled premises during business related activities, the Court has adopted the 
"dual purpose" rule. The Court has also recognized the "going and coming" rule, and 
numerous exceptions to this rule, to govern claims involving travel between home and the 
work place. The Court has adopted a four-part test for cases involving employee 
recreation. This four-part test builds upon and is complimentary to the standards 
established by the premises rule and dual purpose rule. 
In short, this Court has never simply applied a blanket standard to all cases. 
Rather, it has adopted a particular standard to apply to the unique circumstances of the 
claimed accident. This pattern by the Court appropriately recognizes that there are 
varying policy interests which should be considered and weighed in determining the 
ultimate conclusion of whether an injury "arises out of and in the course o f employment. 
See, e.g., Martinson, 606 P.2d 256 (Utah 1980) (discussing the unique problem of 
defining work related activities in occupations which have no set place or hours for 
performing work). 
In its Order, the Labor Commission expressly stated that it found no prior Utah 
case law or Labor Commission opinion which specifically addressed this issue. It 
therefore referred to general language from an old Utah case which, quite clearly, was 
never intended to apply to the varying circumstances of all claimed injuries. The result, 
adopted blindly by the Utah Court of Appeals based upon a standard of review analysis, 
is an extremely broad and difficult rule to manage inasmuch as almost any home activity 
can, arguably, be found to be "incidental" to some work activity. 
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III. PETITIONERS' ARGUMENT - THAT SUBJECTIVE MENTAL INTENT 
SHOULD NOT BE A SUFFICIENT BASIS FOR AN AWARD OF 
BENEFITS - WAS ASSERTED AND BRIEFED BEFORE THE COURT 
OF APPEALS. 
Mr. Tjas claims that AE Clevite asserts, for the first time in this Writ, that Mr. 
Tjas' mental intent is an insufficient basis upon which to award workers compensation 
benefits. This argument is inaccurate. Mr. Tjas' argued to the Court of Appeals that he 
should be awarded benefits based upon his subjective intent to benefit, potentially, his 
employer when he salted his driveway on the day of his accident. Consequently, in 
response, in section (C) of Argument I of AE Clevite's Reply Brief before the Court of 
Appeals, AE Clevite argued that Mr. Tjas' mental intent, without other objective facts to 
support a work relationship, was an insufficient ground to award benefits. The Court 
should accept the Petition for Writ of Certiorari so that this matter may be fully briefed 
and discussed before the Court. 
CONCLUSION 
This case presents a special and important issue of first impression which this 
Court should accept for review and consideration 
lis / / d a DATED thi  /_/ d y of April, 2000. 
BLACKBURN & STOLL, LC 
MichaeNE. Dyer 
Dori K. Petersen 
Attorneys for Petitioners 
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